The myth describing Germany as a “strong and powerful military might before WWII” today is being taken as something granted, as something obvious and logical. Just think of it: Germany managed to invade France, among other European states, it managed to successfully start an invasion against the Soviet Union, and it took few years until Germany was finally defeated and occupied. Such initial success must mean that Germany was in fact a mighty country with powerful army.
As obvious as it might sound, these claims are nothing but a myth, created by historians. A quick look at the diaries of the German military commanders would quickly disintegrate any such vision and would turn it into nothing more than a wishful thinking. Wishful indeed, since the realities were rather different back then and the closer one looks into this subject the more it becomes apparent how lucky was Germany on one hand, and how incompetent were the military commanders of France and Britain, and how stubborn was Stalin on the other. These facts alone provided Germany with its initial successes, NOT the created illusion of their supposedly strong army.
After WWI Germany was left with almost no army, and thus it had to resort to the generous help provided by the Soviet Union in terms of military bases, technology, know-how and training. It was then and there during the late 1920’s when the German military was slowly and secretly being restored in the Soviet Union. As much as this fact is known, it somehow always struck me that it was not given a proper importance by modern historiography, nor was it ever properly questioned: why did the Soviet Union help Germany rebuild its military? Why would the Soviets help its BIG imperialist enemy restore its military?
The reason for not asking these questions is rather obvious: such questions indirectly question the traditional historiography, which claims that the Soviets were “scared” by the surrounding imperialist enemies who were only awaiting the chance to attack them the destroy them. Yet, instead of focusing on building their defense from that “supposed” imperialist treat, the Soviets on the contrary were helping one of them to rebuild its own military forces. Since, it would be impossible to understand the Soviet behavior within the context of the traditional historiography; professional historians simply ignore this important fact, and go on writing their own version of history, which in any way does not fit with the historical events which took place during that period.
It is true that after Hitler took power in Germany, he focused its resources into rebuilding the German military; however, this fact does not in any way prove that as of September 1939 Germany was anywhere near in achieving any major progress in this endeavor. The first two weeks into the Polish campaign and Germany was out of fuel, bombs, among many other necessary military supplies. It was the Soviet invasion of Poland from the east which made this campaign successful for the German army. Had the Soviets kept out of it for longer, the Polish army was most probably going to bring the German invasion to a halt, and thus eliminate any hopes of swift Blitzkrieg victory for the Germans. Since they were not prepared for a prolonged conflict, this could have turned into an unexpected nightmare for Germany. The same would have been true, had the French and British troops attacked Germany to the west.
There are many milestone question marks of the way WWII began, and its tedious but deadly continuation until 1945. The motives behind the actual occurrence of each event forwarded by historians are not usually fully sensible or concrete. The lack of Franco-British attack by land after they officially waged war on Germany is one of those events, which leads to number of possible explanations or perhaps even speculations.
Was it really militarily impossible for the French and British to attack Germany? Not really, it was still September and the weather was perfect for such operation. In fact any attack on Germany, even on a limited scale, would have been most probably deadly for Germany at this early stage of the war, given their complete lack of preparation for a major conflict. The assumption that France and Britain were trying to avoid another war is simply an impossible one, since they did wage war against Germany anyway. Were the Franco-British hoping to have an early conflict and eventually a war between the Germans and the Soviets? This could have been a possible assumption by the Franco-British coalition, but rather unfounded one.
There is also a possibility that after the German-Soviet pact, the French and British were afraid of possible German-Soviet retaliation to a possible land attack on Germany! As strange as it might sound, there is much more logic to such a speculation, then there is to the one preached by the official historiography, that Stalin was afraid of a “joint German-British attack on the Soviet Un ion!” This is simply crazy to assume, let alone to try and believe it. While in September 1939, the French-British coalition was aware that they were “politely sent back home by Stalin” a month earlier, and instead with them, Stalin stroke a deal with Nazi Germany, they were aware of the view the Soviets had about them, which was nothing more than the standard “exploiting imperialists” which had to be eliminated in the name of communism. On the other hand they had seen before their eyes, how Stalin had allowed Hitler to fulfill his territorial goals in Poland and were witnessing it, while wondering what to do, bound to their treaty with Poland.
Possible entrance of the Soviet Union into the Axis was a possibility which Stalin kept evident until the German invasion of June 22, 1941. The British and the French knew about it as well, and must have been worried by such a possibility. A Soviet entrance into the Axis would have meant the end for Britain and France, and the status quo in Europe. Unlike the professional historians, the French and the British governments and their military were aware of the Soviet military potential, and must have feared it: which way would this giant red armored fist strike its next blow?
The Soviet industry was build mainly by UK, France, US and of course Germany and any other nation which could have offered anything new and innovative in the military industry. It was not a secret that the Soviet Union had created the biggest military industry in the world. If we believe the professional historians, who claim that Stalin was afraid of German aggression and that was why he was basically forced to sign the non-aggression pact with Germany, then according to this version, the governments of the West were complete fools, who were blind and had no information whatsoever about the Soviet Union its military potential and what went on there in general. I would assume that it was the professional historians who failed to understand, since the western countries knew well what was building up in the Soviet Union, simply because they directly helped the Soviets in building it, by selling technologies, building factories, and providing their latest military achievements to them.
I think that the reasons behind the Franco-British abstention from attacking Germany by land in 1939 have much to do with their fear of possible German-Soviet coalition against them. Such claim will require an extensive research naturally, but in any case is much more credible, than the claim that the Soviets were afraid of possible British-German coalition against them in 1940-41, when Britain and Germany were at war with each other. Such preposterous claim could be found in the books written by Gabriel Gorodetsky, for example.
As you can see, a simple change in the way one views the Soviet Union and its military potential at the time, could raise a whole new series of questions about the motives which let to the events of that period. Yet number of historians is prepared to accept the new data which shows the Soviets as a major power, rather than scared and unprepared state, but are unwilling to reassess the standard historiography, which was build entirely on the wrong assumptions, such as the myths of a” weak Soviet Union, and a mighty Germany” are.
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