On the Question of Soviet "Fear"

The standard historiography of the international situation in the 1930’s in Europe has the tendency to assume that the Soviet Union feared Germany. Any description of the events which took place then, and the treaties which were signed spin around the unfounded assumption that Germany was strong, and the last thing Stalin wished for was to face her alone! To add to these assumptions, historians go further by explaining that the Soviets feared a war on two fronts, reminding us of the hostilities between them and the Japanese. They give as an example the battle of Khalkhin Gol in the summer of 1939, when Red Army detachments literally executed the first real Blitzkrieg operation, and destroyed the 6^th Japanese army. For unclear motives, the battle is being used by historians as an additional proof of how dire the situation was for the Soviet Union: on the west a mighty and aggressive Germany, on the east the strong Japan.

It would be difficult to speculate what motives let historians to assume such a perspective, but it seems that somewhere in the center of the cacophony called “historiography of WWII”, is a tendency to over-estimate Germany’s real power. Why would anyone do that? Well, by doing so, historians are cleverly trying to explain the complete failure of the French and British military in the spring of 1940, when they managed to loose France in a matter of weeks. Showing Germany as this enormous military might gives the impression that even the joint forces of France and Britain were unable to resist. The truth, however, lies in the false strategy and tactics, which the commanding staff employed and the grave mistakes they made in commanding their forces. It simply tries to hide the plain incompetence of the Franco-British commanding staff.

At the same time, keeping Germany’s image as a mighty military power also provides space for creating the illusion of the weak and worry, and even “scared” Soviet Union. It also allows historians to deny the fact that the European geopolitics at that time was severely manipulated by Stalin, and France, Britain and Germany were simply puppets in his plans. For proud nations such as these three, swallowing the truth is an intolerable shame. It is also here where the interests of them and those of the ex-Soviet Union overlapped. Showing Germany mighty helps the Soviets explain the catastrophe of the first months of the German invasion, and aides them in hiding the real reasons for this catastrophe, which by the way had nothing to do with Germany’s military might, or actually the lack of it!

Today after so much evidence had come out, showing exactly the opposite of their writings, the situation remains unchanged. The fact that Stalin was imperturbable, and had no sign of worry, let alone fear, is comfortably ignored by these historians. Instead of examining the battle of Khalkhin Gol, and draw the correct conclusions, which would explain to a great extend Stalin’s unabashed and calm behavior, even during the first hours and days after the German invasion, historians continue to spread their own version of what actually had happened. The battle of Khalkhin Gol was in no way a sign of Japanese danger to the Soviet Union; it was clear example of the elimination of such a possibility by the Soviets. After Khalkhin Gol Japan gained the courage to start up a war against the United States, but never again against the Soviet Union, even at the most alarming times for the Soviets in the summer of 1941. Furthermore, the Japanese signed a treaty with the Soviets, which the Soviets broke in 1945 with their lightening Blitzkrieg operation against the Japanese forces in Asia.

So how could have the Soviet Union been endangered by a two front war after the Khalkhin Gol operation is completely unclear and not understandable. How could have the Soviet Union been endangered by a war to the west, when there was no border between Germany and the Soviet Union? The Germans had much trouble occupying Poland, and some recent research suggests that had not it been for the Soviet help by invading Poland to the east, Poland might have been actually able to withhold the German invasion. The question about the Soviet invasion of Poland is also very much missing from the historiography. Germany was as much responsible for this act of aggression as the Soviet Union was, especially after the final publishing of the secret protocols of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939, which basically showed how the two aggressors had divided Poland among other countries for themselves. The silence could partially be explained as a gesture by the West for the later Soviet struggle and aid in the battle against Germany, however, it is gestures such as this one which twist history to such an extend, that we will probably need another 100 years to finally figure it all out!