The Origins of the “Soviet Fear” in Western Literature and its Devastating Effect

The issue of fear and its affect on Stalin and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is another fundamental point vastly discussed in the western literature. For what it was worth, fear became the ultimate presumption used by western historians in understanding Stalin and the Soviet Union. Jonathan Haslam, a renowned British historian, uses fear as the basis of his studies on the Soviet foreign policy. According to him, fear of western intervention during the early days of the Bolsheviks and the Civil War in Russia, later continued to be felt as fear from possible capitalist attack on the young, unstable and war thorn socialist state, and then the constant fear of Japanese attack, to be later increased by the fear of the imminent German treat.[1]

Furthermore, fear was the motive for Stalin’s unexpected change of foreign policy on 19 August 1939, which resulted in the well known signing of the Soviet German non-aggression treaty, on 24 August 1939. Fear by Stalin of having to face alone the German treat, made him strike the deal with Hitler, in order “appease” him, by giving him some more lands to the East, and at the same time earning precious time for preparation for the imminent war with Germany. Fear was the reason for Stalin’s reaction to the news of the German invasion on June 22, 1941, Stalin’s fear of the war, a reason Zhukov stated in his memoirs, to describe the disastrous beginning of the German-Soviet conflict for the Red army. In effect, fear was in the heart of everything, concerning the Soviet Union and its leader, according to the older western literature.

Since fear is such an important fundamental, let us try and find the origins of this fear. Where did it come from, and why?
Fear was the main pillow of Soviet internal propaganda. Most have seen the now trendy copies of Soviet propaganda posters from the 1920s onward, with slogans such as, “Don’t gossip! The enemy does not sleep!” etc. The Soviet society was soaked in this propaganda, and there was a reason for that. By doing so the regime could indirectly explain all the misfortunes of the people in the Soviet Union. There is hunger—it is enemy’s fault, there are many arrests—the enemy has infiltrated our society, so be quite and stay quite or else the bourgeoisie will take over and exploit you like it does with the workers in the rest of the world. This propaganda with time was swallowed by the western press and observers to such an extend that they believed that the propaganda published in the Soviet press was in fact real, and therefore felt just as well by those in Kremlin.

Fear could be traced back to many newspaper and magazine articles released back in the days of the establishment and later development of the Soviet Union as a communist state. Then it continued to be used by western journalists and observers as a tool to explain the internal developments within the Soviet Union, such as the rapid collectivization and later industrialization policies were, as well as the foreign policy behavior of the Soviet Union. The basic assumption being, that these policies were necessary for insuring the protection of the Soviet Union against the above mentioned presumed fears. Any researcher interested in the topic that spent some time reading over such articles published in the western press in the 1920s, 1930s, and early 1940s, will inevitably spot this tendency.

The birth of fear as means of explaining the Soviet wonder at the time was only natural and possible because of the lack of information in the western world about its development. What leaked out of the country as information was so unusually brutal in its contents that it was simply difficult to be readily accepted by many in the west, not used to the existence of such authorities. On the other hand, the official Soviet publications were overloaded with glorification propaganda, which aim was to show to the rest of the proletariat how wonderful life was under the new communist regime. Faced with such controversial information about the Soviet Union, the usual cautious western approach was adopted, which among other speculations, came up with the conclusion that fear of its existence was most probably the driving force behind the policies which the communist party was undertaking within the country.

This assumption, however, contradicted with the fundamentals of communism expressed in its ultimate goal to become the new world order, and finally topple the oppressive regimes of the bourgeoisie in the rest of the world. Hence, the information about change of policy in Kremlin, with the famous “socialism in one country,” was seen as the sign that the Bolsheviks had given up on their goal to conquer the world by setting up what they called the world revolution. Instead, the western world decided to see the Soviet Union as this new socialist sate, which judging from their press wants a peaceful coexistence with them.

As additional evidence for this point of view was seen the failed Soviet attempt to occupy Poland in 1920, which it seemed to the westerners, must have persuaded the Kremlin leaders to give up on the idea of world domination. This was also seen as the proof that the Soviet states was weak and exhausted from war, and by demonstrating this weakness to the world with the failed Polish campaign, they must indeed fear for their sole existence, in the face of the mighty capitalist world.

Such point of view, not only delivered, satisfactory and reasonable to the westerners, explanation of the Soviet wonder, but also allowed them to underline their supremacy in terms of political and economic status quo and consecutively in military sense as well. Little did the western world know about the real agenda discussed in Kremlin, and even when they did learn of it from occasional information leaks, they simply refused to believe it.

This western perspective was well understood in Kremlin, and Stalin, as history showed, made the best of it for his own use. Taking advantage of the self-imposed blindness of the western world, he continued to feed it through the official Soviet publications and through his international subsidiaries, the communist parties and movements abroad. Meanwhile, he subdued the country and began a massive import of know-how and technologies from the capitalist states. More interested in selling and earning money, the west eagerly provided the Soviet Union with the latest innovations and industrial achievements, allowing Stalin to quickly build up the largest and most modern military industry.

Meanwhile, the west was preoccupied with mocking at the Soviet’s poor production quality, plan and agricultural failures. They simply absorbed the information published in the official Soviet press such as Pravda and Isvestiya, especially selected and published there for its own propagation interests towards both, the Soviet people and the westerners as well. Preoccupied with sneering, the west failed to see the vast preparations which were going on in the Soviet Union. The massive industry was outputting in unbelievable numbers the finest and most sophisticated examples of military weaponry. The Red army was steadily growing in numbers, but the most the westerners could see was the brutal terror Stalin imposed on his army, and certainly made the appropriate conclusions about it to what they saw, not to what actually was happening.

Fear again found a comfortable nest in the western perception of the Soviet Union, this time describing the obvious feeling that must have been felt among the Red army’s commanding staff, faced with the possibility of being arrested, send to prison, or simply executed. Failure to closely and deeply examine the actual events taking place in the Soviet Union left the west yet again with self-created understanding, rather than actual and objective one.

With Hitler’s coming to power in Germany, and his shift against the pre-established Versailles treaty status quo, the west began to identify a possible future treat in the face of Germany, tired of the harsh conditions it was left in after the end of the World War and the signing of the humiliating for her Versailles treaty. The beginning of the new era for the German army, with its gradual strengthening and modernization through development and armament with heavier weaponry, such as tanks, and the establishment and development of the air force, was quickly overblown in size by the western observers. Ironically, what they failed to see being developed in the Soviet Union, they labeled on the Germans, hence creating another misconception for themselves, in terms of the actual might of Germany and its army.

What part did this western misconception took in the shaping of their foreign policy towards Germany in the late 1930s is difficult to say. Difficult because, any attempt to understand it, might result in being a simple speculation of its own right. What we could easily say is that the policy of appeasement used by the west could have been a direct consequence of their reluctance to begin another war, especially with the mighty enemy, which they seemed to believe Germany actually was. As logic as it might sound, such presumption assumes that the western governments and their intelligence services had also failed into the same trap, in which the press and the general public of the west had fallen earlier.

Assuming, that the governments of the western powers knew better, than what the free press speculations ended up being, it could be said that they probably searched for a better possibility in resolving this upcoming crisis, than having to face Germany alone, and thereby willingly or not, provide Uncle Joe with the chance to enter the war in the best possible for him circumstances, and take over war thorn Europe in a single massive swift operation, especially if the governments were aware of what was being prepared in the Soviet Union, or at least aware of the existing Soviet power, which by definition would allow it to undertake such a an opportunity.

I am more inclined to believe, that the governments of the western powers knew at least partially the real situation and real Soviet potential and power, as well as the real German impotence military wise. If this is true, then the inevitable question of why did not the western powers attack Germany during its preoccupation with the Polish campaign in the early days of September 1939, comes into the agenda.

Possible answers could be the west’s fear of possible future German-Soviet alliance or response, which they were simply unable to resist militarily. Or perhaps they were buying time in hope that this would allow for a possible future German-Soviet conflict, which would then allow the west to deal with both serious treats in the face of NAZI Germany and communist Russia, by mathematically canceling each other out, and allowing the west with minimum efforts and casualties to keep its rule over the old continent. This is to a large extend what actually happened during the Second World War, although the Soviet preparation for the war was so serious, that despite the massive losses inflicted by the German army, they still managed to occupy half of Germany and Europe, and as a consequence the west had to deal with the Cold War for another 45 years to come.

In any case, what should be remembered is that fear was never a part of the Soviet internal or foreign policy, after 1919, when the Bolsheviks had finally gotten the upper hand in the Civil War in Russia. The intend to use fear as means of explaining the Soviet wonder, suggests nothing more than complete ignorance or deliberate dismissal by the author on the history and development of the Soviet Union.

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[1] See J. Haslam’s works or his book review in International Affairs on G. Gorodetsky’s book Grand Delusion (1999).